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Some people are so set on showing the differences between Christianity and Judaism that in 
the process they end up distorting Judaism. Let me start with an example that for the last 
fifteen years must be considered a Jewish teaching. By Jewish teaching I mean a view that is 
taught in the observant community. This doesn't mean that all or even most people will agree 
with it, anymore than they agree with the ideas of Daas Torah, religious Zionism, religious 
anti-Zionism, or that the shirayim of the Rebbe has mystical significance. But agree or not, 
these are clearly Jewish teachings. 
 
Today it must be admitted that Judaism and Christianity share a belief in the Second Coming 
of the Messiah. While this is an obligatory belief for Christians, for Jews it is, like so many 
other notions, simply an option. The truth of my statement is seen in the fact that messianist 
Habad is part and parcel of traditional Judaism, and, scandal or not, most of the leading Torah 
authorities have been indifferent to this. That is, they see it as a mistaken belief, but not one 
that pushes its adherent out of the fold. In other words, it is like so many other false ideas in 
Judaism, all of which fall under the rubric "Jewish beliefs." As long as these beliefs don't 
cross any red lines, the adherents are regarded as part of the traditional Jewish community. 
 
To give a parallel example, many people reading this post are good rationalists, and therefore 
regard astrology as quite foolish. But we are all well aware of the many Jewish teachers who 
taught the efficacy of this system. Therefore, astrology must be regarded as an acceptable 
belief for adherents of traditional Judaism. Whether it is correct or not is a completely 
different matter, and if the latter criteria determines whether something is included under the 
rubric of traditional Judaism, then it will be a small tent indeed. 
 
Unlike Professor David Berger, it doesn't overly concern me that the belief in a Second 
Coming didn't exist twenty years ago. After all, Judaism is a developing religion. Two 
hundred years ago leading Torah scholars criticized Hasidism for advocating all sorts of new 
ideas, and yet these too became part of Judaism. In another fifty years the notion of a Jewish 
Second Coming will probably be seen by most as just another Hasidic eccentricity (albeit the 
province of only one sect), up there with prayers after the proper time and shirayim. The 
important point for me is what makes a belief an acceptable one in Judaism is not whether it is 
new, and certainly not whether it is correct, but whether the rabbinic leaders tolerate it. Over 
time they have shown that they can tolerate all sorts of foolish doctrines, Habad messianism 
being merely the latest.  
 
Professor Berger argued his case valiantly, but it has largely fallen on deaf ears, and this 
includes the ears of great Torah scholars. So, like it or not, traditional Judaism now 
encompasses hasidim and mitnagdim, rationalists and kabbalists, Zionists and anti-Zionists, 
and those who think the Messiah will be coming for the first time together with those who 
think it will be a return trip. 
 
  1What has occurred with Habad messianism and its painless integration into wider Orthodoxy 
can also teach us something with regard to the history of Judaism and Christianity. Had Paul 
not insisted on his antinomian path, that is, had the Law remained central to early Christianity, 
there is no reason to assume that there would have been a break with Pharisaic Judaism.  
 
When thinking about Habad, there is one other point we have to bear in mind. There are great 
Torah scholars who unfortunately believe the messianic foolishness, and they should be 
treated with respect. After all, R. Hayyim Joseph David Azulai, the Hida, quoted from the 
works of scholars who continued to believe in Shabbetai Zvi even after his apostasy.33 He 
certainly opposed their Sabbatianism, and we must oppose the Habad messianism, but one's 
religious legitimacy in contemporary Orthodoxy is not destroyed because of the belief in a 
false Messiah.  
 
Let me now return to an issue mentioned already, namely, the naivete in dealing with the 
differences between Judaism and Christianity that is common in Orthodox circles, especially 
among those who engage in apologetics and kiruv type activities. To give an example that I 
have both seen in print and heard in lectures, there are those who talk about how compared to 
Catholicism Judaism is a much more realistic religion when it comes to divorce, in that it 
permits it if people don't get along. That is fine, as far as it goes, but some people then go 
overboard and denigrate any outlook that opposes "Judaism's position." In doing so, these 
well-meaning people end up of denigrating Beit Shammai's view. Some will recall that Beit 
Shammai said that "a man may not divorce his wife unless he has found in her some unseemly 
conduct" (Gittin 9:10), which means unchastity. Now the halakhah is not in accord with Beit 
Shammai, but his is certainly a Jewish position. Any presentation of Judaism that presents the 
standard view of divorce as "the" Jewish position, and denigrates any other approach, has the 
unintended consequence of denigrating Beit Shammai as not having had a "Jewish" position.  
 
In other words, it is disparaging to Beit Shammai for any contemporary to speak about how 
Beit Hillel's view is "better" than that of Beit Shammai. In fact, there are traditional sources 
that speak about how in Messianic days the halakhah will follow Beit Shammai, in this and in 
all other disputes. I think the traditional position would be to assert that Beit Hillel's position 
is not objectively any "better", and certainly not more ethical, than that of Beit Shammai. 
Furthermore, a number of poskim actually hold that Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai only 
dispute about a second (or subsequent) marriage, but that with regard to the first marriage, 
Beit Hillel agrees with Beit Shammai that a man can divorce his wife only if he finds a matter 
of unchastity. R. Solomon ben Simeon Duran goes even further and asserts that in this dispute 
the halakhah is actually in accord with Beit Shammai!
34ואע"ג דב"ש וב"ה הלכה כב"ה משמע הכא 
דהלכה כב"ש  
 
This is not the accepted halakhah, but it illustrates how unseemly it is to portray a position 
held by important poskim as out of touch or foolish. As mentioned above, I have seen many 
times when apologists try to show the beauty of Judaism by contrasting it positively with 
some "non-Jewish" position (on the unsophisticated assumption that the best way to better 
their position is by denigrating another). As noted, I have also observed that sometimes the 
position they are denigrating happens to also be a Jewish position (just not the accepted 
position). Of course, when you point this out to them, and show them that the way they were 
arguing had the unintended consequence of ridiculing a position held by traditional Jewish 
figures, they immediately apologize and give assurances that they won't do so again.  
 
My question always is, why not? Five minutes ago they were happy to declare how unfair or 
foolish a certain position is, and once being informed that the position is also held by Jewish 
  2thinkers they drop their argument like a hot potato. Are we to conclude that it is not the 
inherent logic of an argument that gives it validity, but only who its adherents are? Does an 
approach only stop being ridiculous when the polemicist learns that it was held by a 
traditional thinker? Obviously yes, which leads to the conclusion that there is no purpose in 
the polemicist arguing the merits of his case at all, since everything he states is only 
conditional. In other words, the polemicist is telling us: "I can attack a position as being 
foolish and illogical, but this is only when I think the position is held by non-Jewish or non-
traditional thinkers. Once I learn that the position is also held by traditional thinkers, all of my 
previous words of criticism should be regarded as null and void." This is another example of 
what elsewhere I have termed the "elastic" nature of Jewish apologetics and polemics. 
 
With this in mind, let me now say something that I know will make many people 
uncomfortable, but which I have felt for a long time. Throughout Jewish literature one can 
find any number of explanations as to how the notion of the Trinity is in direct opposition to 
Jewish teachings, since Judaism demands a simple, unified God. There is no doubt that for 
much of our history this was the standard view. However, once the doctrine of the sefirot 
arises on the scene, matters change. Many of the arguments put forth by kabbalists to explain 
why the belief in the sefirot does not detract from God's essential unity could also be used to 
justify the Trinity, a fact recognized by the opponents of the sefirotic doctrine. Since the 
doctrine of the sefirot has become part and parcel of Judaism, we must now acknowledge that 
Judaism does not require a simple Maimonidean-like, divine unity.  
 
In fact, without any reference to the sefirot, R. Judah Aryeh Modena was able to conclude that 
one could indeed justify the notion of the Trinity so that it did not stand in opposition to basic 
Jewish beliefs about God's unity. As Modena points out in his anti-Christian polemic, Magen 
va-Herev, the real Jewish objection to the Christian godhead is not found in any notion of a 
Triune God, but in the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation.
35 The idea that God assumed 
human form, i.e., that a human is also God, is regarded by us as way over the line. This is not 
only because it deifies a human, but also because there is a great difference between a 
spiritual God divided into different "parts," and an actual physical division in God. The latter 
is certainly in violation of God's unity even according to the most extreme sefirotic 
formulations. (It would not, however, appear to be in violation of R. Moses Taku's 
understanding of God, since he posits that God can assume form in this world at the same 
time that He is in the heavens. For Taku, Christianity's heresy would thus be seen only in their 
worship of a human, which is avodah zarah.) 
 
From the Trinity, let's turn to Virgin Birth, another phenomenon which everyone knows is not 
a Jewish concept, or is it? If by Virgin Birth one means conception through the agency of 
God, then there is no such concept in Judaism. Yet if by Virgin Birth we also include 
conception without the presence of human sperm, then as we shall soon see, this indeed 
accepted by some scholars. (I stress human sperm, so that we can exclude the legend of Ben 
Sira's conception, which occurred by means of a bathtub, not to mention all of the responsa 
dealing with artificial insemination.) 
 
Pre-modern man believed in all sorts of strange things, one of which was the concept of the 
incubus and the succubus, which was found in many cultures. The idea was that male and 
female demons would have sex with humans while they slept. Among the outstanding 
Christian figures who believed the notion possible include Augustine and Aquinas.
36 This was 
an especially good way to explain an unwanted pregnancy: just blame it on the demon. While 
the classic example of the incubus is when a male demon comes upon a sleeping woman, 
there were times when this happened while both parties were awake, and we will soon see 
  3such a case in Jewish history. Lest one think that this is only a pre-modern superstition, what 
about all those people who claim to have had sexual relations with aliens who abducted 
them?
37 
 
As the superstitions in Jewish society have often mirrored those of the dominant culture, we 
shouldn't be surprised that sex with demons comes up in our literature. Already the Talmud 
(Eruvin 18b) speaks of Adam begetting various types of demons. This source doesn't say who 
the mother was, but since it wasn't Eve it must be a female demon. Yet the Talmud is quick to 
note that Adam never actually had sex with this female demon. Rather, she impregnated 
herself with his sperm that was emitted accidentally. Throughout Jewish history there were 
women who were believed to have had sex with demons, and this raised halakhic issues that 
had to be dealt with. There is no need for me to give various sources on this as they have been 
nicely collected by Hannah G. Sprecher in a fascinating article.
38 I will just mention one point 
which I find interesting, and which I mentioned in one of my lectures on R. Ben Zion Uziel.
39 
While R. Uziel is in many respects a model for a Modern Orthodox posek, it is quite jarring to 
find that he too takes seriously the claim that a woman was intimate with a demon. Instead of 
sending her to a psychologist, he devotes great efforts to showing that she can remain with her 
kohen husband.
40 That poskim would discuss this sort of thing is not surprising, and in an 
earlier post I mentioned a current talmid chacham who discusses if one can eat the flesh of a 
demon. Similarly, Sprecher cites a twentieth-century work that deals with circumcising a 
child whose father was a demon.
41 Yet to find R. Uziel, a supposedly modern posek, also 
taking this very seriously was quite a surprise to me. I guess the greater surprise was that of 
the various women involved with the demons. While some were no doubt off their rocker, 
others presumably just invented the story to save themselves from the shame of an improper 
relationship and its consequences. Imagine their surprise when instead of being condemned 
for their illicit affair, the rabbis actually believed the story that they made up, namely, that the 
man they had sex with was really a demon!
42 
 
Once a woman is believed to have had sex with a demon, and certainly if she had a child in 
this fashion, people are generally not going to want to have anything to do with her and her 
family. Being descended from the Devil is hardly the best yichus. Yet much of the world 
began like this, at least according to one early interpretation. Targum Ps.-Jonathan to Gen. 4:1 
explains that Cain's father is not Adam, but Sammael, who also is known as Satan and the 
Angel of Death. As James Kugel has shown, this tradition is found in other early sources, 
such as 1 John 3:12 which describes Cain as being "of the Evil One." Pirkei de-Rabbi Eliezer 
21 describes how the serpent impregnated Eve, and we know from other sources that the 
serpent is none other than Sammael. While we might be inclined to smile and regard this all 
as pleasant folklore, there is actually much more here than meets the eye. As Kugel brilliantly 
notes, this portrayal of Cain serves to explain why God did not accept his sacrifice, a point 
that is never explained in the text. In addition, it helps solve the puzzling comment of Eve 
(Gen. 4:1): "I have gotten a man with the Lord," understanding "man" to mean angel, as is 
elsewhere found in Scripture.
43 
 
Lest one think that in modern times tales of the Devil's children are only to be found in novels 
and on the big screen – one immediately thinks of Rosemary's Baby and The Omen – let me 
tell you a fascinating story. In the beginning of the nineteenth century a married woman 
named Yittel Levkovich gave birth to a child which, we are told, was obviously not her 
husband's. Yittel claimed that she had been raped by a male demon. This claim was accepted 
and the woman was not regarded as an adulteress nor was the child regarded as a mamzer. Yet 
other Jews refused to marry with the descendants of this woman, and these descendants were 
known as "Chitshers." Matters got to be so bad that in 1926 a broadside was published signed 
  4by many Hungarian rabbis declaring that there was no problem marrying into the Chitshers. 
Among the signatories was the young R. Joel Teitelbaum, the rav of Satmar. 
 
Despite this plea, there were those who continued to shun the Chitchers, and even to this day 
there are families in the Hungarian hasidic world who will refuse to intermarry with other 
Hungarian hasidim since the latter are descended from Yittel and the demon. Tying in with 
the Christian theme with which I began this post, there was even a belief that a Chitcher has 
the image of a cross under his skin opposite the heart!
44 Take a look at the end of this 
responsum. 
 
 
 
  5 
  6 
This is a fascinating topic, and those who want more details should consult the previously 
mentioned article by Sprecher, from which I took the information mentioned until now. One 
aspect of the story that appeared too late to be included by Sprecher is mentioned by Jerome 
Mintz, and shows how despite R. Yoel Teitelbaum's words of support for the Chitshers, this 
did not carry on to one of the inheritors of his throne. 
 
Jerome Mintz records the following from a Satmar informant: 
  7 
The Satmar Rebbe's son, the oldest son, Aaron, he has sometimes a big mouth. Aaron, the 
Rebbe's son, gave a speech and he called Ableson's45 mother a hatzufah [impudent woman]. 
"This Ableson's mother--that impudent woman with her tsiganer [gypsy] family--came to the 
shul and starts yelling." You know, with that phrase he was trying to bring up an old pain. 
 
There is an old story about the Ableson family, given only from mouth to ear, about the 
quality of their family. There were some rumors about a hundred years ago about the Ableson 
family, that it's not so spotless. A woman in the family had a relationship with some demon or 
something and that's how the branch of the family got started. . . . Nobody knows how she 
became pregnant. She went away to a different town and came back pregnant and she didn't 
have any love affair. She was a virgin. She was still a virgin. . . . It's written in a lot of books 
at that time. The Kotsker, on of the big rabbis, said that one of their ancestors was made 
pregnant by a demon. 
 
This goes back six generations. The family is spread out and the descendants feel a little 
guilty. They try to behave, you know, so that nobody should throw it back at them. The family 
is so widespread because they're so rich. They've gotten into every family. They're very 
aggressive people, probably because they come from the devil. . . . Even today when 
somebody is making a marriage arrangement he wants to find out if the family is not from the 
witches. I know that my mother and my father when they made a marriage arrangement, it 
was a day before they left the country, they found out if there's a witch or not.46   
 
 
 
The R. Aaron mentioned in this story is one of the current Satmar Rebbes. 
e find another example where a large family was ostracized in this fashion. The problem 
 
W
here was especially acute as many great Torah scholars had married into this family, and now 
aspersions were being cast on it. Those casting the aspersions referred to the family members 
as Nadler, which has the connotation of mamzer. (As with the term mamzer, it was also used 
as a general term of abuse and is the subject of a responsum of R. Solomon Luria.
47) Because 
of the growing calumnies against innocent families, the Maharal and numerous other great 
rabbis were forced to publicly support them and condemn all who would question their 
yichus.
48 What I don't understand is how, considering the base origin of the term "Nadler" and 
how it was used in such an abusive fashion, that the word actually became an acceptable last 
name. Indeed, it is now more than acceptable and people are proud to have this name, which 
they share with two outstanding scholars, not to mention my former congressman. 
 
* * *  
 
eturning to the issue of Christianity, many have discussed whether or not it is considered 
 
R
avodah zarah. I will deal with this at a future time, but now I want to raise another issue 
which I mentioned briefly in Limits of Orthodox Theology: What is worse, atheism or avodah 
zarah? Subsequent to the book's appearance I found more sources related to this, which I hope 
to come back to in a future post. For now, let me just call attention to found a very interesting 
comment of R. David Zvi Hoffmann with regard to avodah zarah. It is found in R. Hayyim 
Hirschenson's journal, Ha-Misderonah 1 (1885), p. 137. In speaking about the practice of the 
Talmud to sometime use euphemistic language, he claims that the expression "Grave is 
avodah zarah, for whoever denies it is as if he accepts the whole Torah" (Hullin 5a and 
  8parallels) is an example of this. In other words, the Talmud really means: "Grave is avodah 
zarah, for whoever accepts it denies the entire Torah." I had never thought of this and it is 
certainly interesting. Hoffmann is himself led to this interpretation, which he sees as obvious, 
because if it was really the case that one who rejected avodah zarah would be regarded as one 
who accepts the Torah, how come a public Sabbath violator who rejects avodah zarah is still 
regarded as having rejected the Torah?  
 
Nevertheless, despite its immediate appeal, I don't think Hoffmann's interpretation can be 
hile on the subject of Christianity, I would like to respond to the reaction of some who read 
accepted, and the passage is not to be regarded as euphemistic. Rather, it is an example of the 
Sages' exaggerations, which we find in other places as well, such as where they state that a 
certain commandment is equal to all six hundred thirteen. In fact, I have what I think is 
conclusive proof that Hoffmann is mistaken in regarding this passage as expressing a 
euphemism. In Megillah 13a the passage appears in an altered form: "Anyone who repudiates 
avodah zarah is called 'a Jew.'" The Talmud then cites a biblical proof text to support this 
statement which shows that it was not meant to be understood as a euphemism. 
 
W
my opinion piece on John Hagee. There I showed that what got so many upset, namely, 
Hagee's theological understanding of the Holocaust, was actually shared by R. Zvi Yehudah 
Kook.
49 Of course, I understand why people feel that attempting to explain the Holocaust is 
improper. I happen to share this sentiment. Yet if people are upset by what Hagee said, just 
wait until they see the following, which out of all the supposed justifications for the 
Holocaust, which have ranged the gamut, this is surely the most bizarre. What can I say, other 
than that it never ceases to amaze me how some of the greatest scholars we have say some of 
the craziest stuff imaginable. 
 
I am referring to one of the reasons R. Ovadiah Hadaya gives to explain the Holocaust. He 
saw it as God's way of cleansing the world of all the mamzerim!
50 How a sensitive scholar, 
which Hadaya certainly was,
51 could offer such an explanation really boggles the mind. To 
think that the cruel murder of six million, including over a million children, not to mention all 
of the other terrible results of the Holocaust, was in order to complete some yichus program is 
beyond strange. I can't recall who it was who said that any attempts at explaining suffering are 
invalid if you are not prepared to tell it to a parent whose child is dying of cancer. I certainly 
can't imagine anyone telling a parent that his family was wiped out in the Holocaust in order 
to get rid of the mamzerim! (A well-known American haredi rosh yeshiva responded very 
strongly when told about what Hadaya wrote, but I don't have permission to quote his words.) 
Prof. David Halivni commented, when I told him about Hadaya's view, that Sephardim often 
don't get it when it comes to the Holocaust. I remember thinking about Halivni's comment 
when R. Ovadiah Yosef gave his own explanation for the Holocaust, some years ago, one 
which created such a storm that Holocaust survivors protested outside his home. He claimed 
that the dead were really reincarnated souls suffering for their sins in previous lifetimes. 
 
Although he doesn't mention it, Hadaya's view is obviously based on the Jerusalem Talmud, 
 עדונ היה םירזממה קר ותומי אל םאש םשייבל אלש ידכו םירזממה תולכל אלא רזגנ אלש ברח וא רבד תגירה שי
 
Yevamot 8:3, which speaks of a catastrophe coming on the world every few generations which 
destroys both mamzerim and non-mamzerim (the latter are destroyed as well, so that it not be 
known who committed the sin.) Sefer Hasidim, ed. Margaliot, no. 213, repeats this teaching. 
 
 
 התרבח ינפמ תשייבתמ החפשמה התיהו ] םהמע םירשכה לטונ ןכלו [  
  9It is with regard to the issue of the mamzer that one can see manifested a point I have often 
thought about. The great classical historian Moses Finley spoke of what he termed the 
"teleological fallacy" in the interpretation of historical change. "It consists in assuming the 
existence from the beginning of time, so to speak, of the writer's values . . . and in then 
examining all earlier thought and practice as if they were, or ought to have been, on the road 
to this realization, as if men in other periods were asking the same questions and facing the 
same problems as those of the historian and his world."
52 
 
 
The fact is that earlier generations often thought very differently about things. For example, 
e see this very clearly when it comes to the issue of the mamzer who through no fault of his 
we are much more sensitive to matters such as human rights than they were. They took 
slavery for granted, while the very concept of owning another person is the most detestable 
thing imaginable to us. Followers of R. Kook will put all of this in a religious framework, and 
see it as humanity's development as it gets closer to the Messianic era. 
 
W
own suffers terribly. The Orthodox community is very sympathetic to his fate, and it is 
unimaginable that people today will, as in the past express satisfaction at the death of a 
mamzer.
53 A difficulty with the sympathetic approach is the Shulhan Arukh's ruling (Yoreh 
Deah 265:4) that when the mamzer is born אין מבקשים עליו רחמים. The Shakh writes: כלומר אין 
אומרים  קיים  את  הילד  כו',  מטעם  דלא  ניחא  להו  לישראל  הקדושים  לקיים  הממזרים  שביניהם. In fact, 
according to R. Bahya ibn Paquda (Hovot ha-Levavot, Sha'ar ha-Teshuvah, ch. 10), if one is 
responsible for bringing a mamzer into the world, and then does a proper teshuvah, "God will 
destroy the offspring." Needless to say, if a modern person believed this to be true, it hardly 
would encourage him or her to do teshuvah.
54 (Philippe Ariès could perhaps have cited this 
text in order to bolster his controversial thesis that medieval parents were indifferent to their 
children, as it is unimaginable that a contemporary preacher would tell parents that the result 
of their teshuvah would mean the death of their child.) 
 
What, from today's standards, would be the most cruel thing imaginable, is described by R. 
Ishmael ha-Kohen of Modena, the last great Italian posek (Zera Emet 3:111).
55 R. Ishmael 
rules that the word "mamzer" should be tattooed (by a non-Jew) on a mamzer baby's 
forehead!
56 This will prevent him from being able to marry. I know that no contemporary 
rabbi would recommend such a step (although the Zera Emet's advice is quoted in R. Zvi 
Hirsch Shapira's Darkhei Teshuvah,  Yoreh Deah 190:11). Nor would anyone want the 
mamzer's house or grave to be plastered, as was apparently the opinion of some in talmudic 
days, in order that people would be able to shun him.
57 
 
 
This leads to an issue that would require an entire volume to adequately deal with it. This 
volume would trace the Orthodox confrontation with changing values and show how 
Orthodox practices and ideas have responded. It is obvious that there is much more in the way 
of reevaluation of prior ideas in the Modern Orthodox world, but there is also a great deal in 
the haredi world as well. As noted already, I have observed this personally when haredi 
figures, and not only of the kiruv variety, have asserted that certain ideas and concepts are in 
opposition to Jewish values, and have then been flustered when I showed them that great 
figures of the past have actually put forth what today is regarded, even in the haredi world, as 
immoral statements.  
 
  10Examples of this are easy to find. R. Jehiel Jacob Weinberg pointed to one: the Rambam's 
ruling in Issurei Biah 12:10. I am reluctant to spell this out here, because I know how it could 
be used by anti-Semites, so let me just quote it in Hebrew. 
 
 
היוגה לע אבש לארשי --  דחא םויו םינש שולש תב הנטק ןיב  [!] הלודג ןיב  , שיא תשא ןיב היונפ ןיב  ,  היה וליפאו
דחא םויו םינש עשת ןב ןטק -- ןודזב היוגה לע אבש ןויכ  , הידי לע הלקת לארשיל תאבש ינפמ תגרהנ וז ירה  ,
המהבכ .  
 
 
 
I don't think that there is any sane person in the world, no matter what community he is in, 
who would advocate this in modern times.
58 Furthermore, if you defend, even in the most 
right wing community, what Maimonides says here with regard to an innocent child, you will 
be regarded as evil. The traditional commentators are at a loss to explain where Maimonides 
got this. 
 
This example was pointed to by Weinberg as one of the traditional passages which most 
distressed him. Let me give another example which again illustrates how often contemporary 
moral judgments are far removed from those of previous generations, even when dealing with 
great Jewish leaders. R. Zvi Hirsch Chajes claims that a king has the right to kill the innocent 
children of someone who rebels, because of tikun olam,
59 and the Hatam Sofer, in a letter to 
Chajes, find this a reasonable position.
60 The purpose of the killing would be to put fear into 
others, who while may be willing to risk their own lives in rebellion, would be deterred if 
their families were wiped out. This is certainly not what anyone today would regard as 
"Jewish values."
61 In fact, Seforno, Netziv, and Meshekh Hokhmah, in their commentaries to 
Deut. 24:16 ("Children shall not be put to death for the fathers"), specifically reject this 
possibility, with Seforno noting how this was a typical Gentile practice that the Torah is 
legislating against.
62 In such a case, we have to follow the guidance of R. Jehiel Jacob 
Weinberg, who believed that if there is a dispute among halakhic authorities, the poskim must 
reject the view that will bring Torah into disrepute in people's eyes (Kitvei ha-Gaon Rabbi 
Jehiel Jacob Weinberg, vol. 1, p. 60): 
 
 
רדהל הלגאו "  ג ] ארגה " ןמרטנוא י  [ יבלבש המ  :  התוא דגנ עירכהל םינברה םיכירצ םינושארה תקולחמ שיש םוקמש
העדה  , הות דגנ געללו לוזלזל תמרוגו תוירבה תעדמ הקוחר איהש " ק  
 
 
R. Shlomo Aviner has the same approach (Am ve-Artzo, vol. 2, pp. 436-437) . He refuses to 
say that any rishon was less moral than another, but he notes that conceptions of morality 
change over time and not every decision of a posek is an eternal decision. Today, when we 
have different standards of morality than in previous days. If there is a dispute among the 
authorities, we should adopt the position which we regard as more moral. 
 
 
 
 
ןאכלו ןאכל םינפ הכלהבש רורבו  . רתוי םיירסומ םיביתנ םה הלא םיביתנש ןוויכ ןכל  , םהיפ לע עירכהל ונילע  .
תערכומ הכלהה םימעפל  , קחדה תעש ללגב  , גהנמה ךכ יכ תערכומ הכלהה םימעפלו  . ןכ םא  ,  ונימיב ' גהנמה  '  אוה
 ירסומ תויהל  . . . תואיצמה יפ לע םינתשמה םיירסומ םיגשומ םג שי  . ןטקה ונבל רטוסה בא  ,  רטוסה באל המוד וניא
  11הרשע הנומשה ןב ונבל  . ירסומ אל וא ירסומ השעמ איה ונבל יחל תריטס םאה  ? תוביסנב יולת  .  תוערכה לכ אל
 תויחצנ תוערכה ןה םיקסופה  . . . תויתכלהה וניתוערכהל םיפרטצמש םיירסומ םילוקיש םנשי םויכ ונבצמב  
 
 
 
In a recent by book by R. Yuval Sherlo, Reshut ha-Rabim, p. 102, he acknowledges moral 
advancement and concludes: "Despite all the hypocricy and cynicism there is moral progress 
in the area of human rights. True religious people believe that this is the will of God." 
 
 
All this stands in opposition to R. J. David Bleich's incredible statement: "The halakhic 
enterprise, of necessity, proceeds without reference or openness to, much less acceptance or 
rejection of, modernity. Modernity is irrelevant to the formulation of halakhic 
determinations"  Contemporary Halakhic Problems (New York, 1995), vol. 4, p. xvii 
(emphasis added). This statement is wrong on so many levels that I am inclined to think that 
Bleich simply didn't express himself properly and meant to say something other than what 
appears from his words. In any event, in a future post I will return to Bleich's controversial 
understanding of the halakhic process.  
 
As to the general problem of laws that trouble the ethical sense of people, we find that it is R. 
Kook who takes the bull by the horns and suggests a radical approach. The issue was much 
more vexing for R. Kook than for other sages, as in these types of matters he could not simply 
tell people that their consciences were leading them astray and that they should submerge 
their inherent feelings of right and wrong. It is R. Kook, after all, who famously says that fear 
of heaven cannot push aside one's natural morality (Shemonah Kevatzim 1:75): 
 
 
םדאה לש יעבטה רסומה תא קחדתש םימש תאריל רוסא  , הרוהט םימש תארי דוע הניא זא יכ  .  םימש תאריל ןמיס
אוה הרוהט  , יעבטה רסומהשכ  , םדאה לש רשיה עבטב עוטנה  ,  אוהש הממ תוהובג רתוי תולעמב היפ לע הלועו ךלוה
הידעלבמ דמוע  . תאזכ הנוכתב םימש תארי רייוצת םא לבא  , לע התעפשה אלבש  םיטונ רתוי םייחה ויה םייחה 
בוט לועפל  , ללכלו טרפל םיליעומ םירבד לעופה לא איצוהלו  , אוהה לעופה חכ טעמתמ התעפשה יפ לעו  ,  תארי
הלוספ הארי איה תאזכ םימש .  
 
 
These are incredible words. R. Kook was also "confident that if a particular moral intuition 
reflecting the divine will achieves widespread popularity, it will no doubt enable the halakhic 
authorities to find genuine textual basis for their new understanding."
63 R. Kook formulates 
his idea as follows (Iggerot ha-Reiyah, vol. 1, p. 103): 
 
 
 
הרותבש טפשמ הזיא לע הלאש לופת םאו  , רחא ןפואב ןבומ תויהל ךירצש הארנ היהי רסומה יגשומ יפלש  ,  םא זא
ע תמאב " ב פ " כ רמאנ אל טפשמה הזש טלחוי לודגה ד " םניא רבכש םיאנתה םתואב א  , ע אצמי יאדו " הרותב רוקמ ז .  
 
R. Kook is not speaking about apologetics here, but a revealing of Torah truth that was 
previously hidden. The truth is latent, and with the development of moral ideas, which is 
driven by God, the new insight in the Torah becomes apparent.
64 In a volume of R. Kook's 
writings that appeared in 2008, he elaborates on the role of natural morality) Kevatzim mi-
Ketav Yad Kodsho, vol. 2, p. 121 [4:16]): 
 
 
  12םלועב רבגתמ יעבטה רסומהשכ  , היהתש הרוצ הזיאב  , ורוקמממ ותוא וכותל לבקל םדא לכ בייח  ,  ותולגתהמ ונייהד
םלועב  , הרותה תוחרא יפ לע סלפי ויטרפ תאו  . קקוזמו ץימא רוהטה רסומה ודיב הלעי זא .  
 
 
Another interesting statement from R. Kook on developing morality is found in Pinkesei ha-
Reiyah, also published in 2008. (In a future post I will have more to say about these two new 
volumes.) In discussing how terrible war is, and the concept of a "permissible war," which is 
recognized as a halakhic category, he notes that the latter is only suitable for a world which 
hasn't developed properly, one which still sees war as a means to achieve things, This proper 
development can only come when all peoples have reached an elevated stage, since, pace 
Gandhi, you can't have one nation practice the higher morality of no war while other nations 
are still using force. R. Kook describes "permissible war" as follows (p. 29): 
 
 
כ הרמאנ אל תושר תמחלמ לש תאזה הרותה לכ " ךוניחב הרמגנ אלש תוישונאל א .  
 
 
The way the Torah shows this is by the law of yefat toar, concerning which R. Kook writes: 
 
 
ישונאה ךוניח תילכתל האב אלש המואל קר יכ הלקנ לע ןיבי בל לכ  , םהמ םידיחי וא  ,  רצי דגנכ רבדל חרכה היהי
ע ערה " רבודמה ןפואב היבשב ראות תפי תחיקל י  . ראות תפי ןידמ םמורתהל ונילעש םשכש דמלנ הזמו  ,  הכזנ ןכ
ה רקיעמ םמורתהל תושר תמחלמ לש ךוניח  , יאנגל אלא וניא ןייז ילכ לכש ריכנו .  
 
 
Wouldn't it be great to hear rabbis talk about stuff like this on Shabbat?! On the very next 
page of Pinkesei ha-Reiyah, R. Kook applies the same insight to the issue of slavery, seeing it 
as only a temporary phenomenon, one that the Torah wishes to see done away with. 
 
In addition to what I have quoted from him in note 64, R. Norman Lamm has also recently 
written something else relevant to the issue being discussed: 
 
If anyone harbors serious doubts about inevitable changes in the moral climate in favor of 
heightened sensitivity, consider how we would react if in our own times someone would 
stipulate as the nadan for his daughter the equivalent of the one hundred Philistine foreskins 
which Saul demanded of David (1 Samuel 18:25) and which dowry David later offered to him 
for his daughter Michal's hand in marriage (II Samuel 3:14) . . . The difference in perspective 
is not only a matter of esthetics and taste but also of morals.
65 
 
He then develops the notion of a developing halakhic morality in which our evolving 
understanding of morality lead us back to the Torah "to rediscover what was always there in 
the inner folds of the Biblical texts and halakhic traditions" (pp. 226-227). 
 
 
To be continued 
 
 
 
* * * 
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Many of you reading this post have purchased my book Studies in Maimonides and His 
Interpreters. In the first printing there is an unfortunate typo in the very last word (there are 
also some typos in the Hebrew section). Although I read through the book a few times before 
printing, as did a copy-editor, we didn't notice it. Neither did numerous others who read the 
book, and I thank R. Yoel Catane, the editor of Ha-Ma'ayan, who was the first to catch the 
mistake (which has been fixed in the new printing). While the last word reads ,מחמר this 
should actually be מחמד, and was understood to refer to Muhammad. I was very upset upon 
learning of the careless typo. Seeing how I was beating myself up, my friend Shlomo 
Tikoshinski wrote to me as follows: לאו דמחמר - אין לוקין עליו (see Shabbat 154a, Mishneh 
Torah, Hilkhhot Shabbat 20:1) 
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